Malaysia |

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1 Introduction and
background
1.1 Key demographic and
economic data
Malaysia covers an area
of some 330,000 square kilometres in Southeast Asia. Peninsular Malaysia forms the
southern portion of mainland Southeast Asia, with Thailand to the north and the island of
Singapore to the south. The East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak constitute the
northern part of the island of Borneo. Malaysia is a multi-racial society following
large-scale immigration of Chinese and Indians from the nineteenth century. In 1995, the
population of 20.1 million included 58 per cent Bumiputera (ethnic Malays and
indigenous people), 26 per cent Chinese, 7 per cent Indians and 3 per cent others. The
remaining 6 per cent were non-citizens, primarily foreign workers brought in because of
labour shortages.
The population density
is around 61 people per square kilometre, the lowest for any country in this study. The
total fertility rate remains relatively high at 3.4 births per woman in 1995. This,
combined with substantial immigration of foreign workers from neighbouring countries,
contributed to robust population growth of 2.4 per cent per year between 1990 and 1995.
Malaysia is by far the
wealthiest country included in the study, and is the only one classified as an upper
middle income country by the World Bank. GNP per capita was $3,890 in 1995, 40 per cent
higher than that of Thailand and nearly four times that of any other country in the study.
Economic growth has been rapid in recent years with per capita income increasing by 5.7
per cent per year between 1985 and 1995, although the current financial crisis in
Southeast Asia has led to a marked slowdown in growth in the short term. The structure of
the economy reflects Malaysias status as a newly industrialising country, with
industry constituting 43 per cent of GDP in 1995 and agriculture having only a 13 per cent
share. Fifty-four (54) per cent of the population lived in urban areas, the highest for
any country in the study.
Performance in terms of
human development is also generally good. Life expectancy at birth was 71 in 1995,
slightly below Sri Lanka but higher than for any other country in the study. The infant
mortality rate was 12 per thousand live births, the lowest for any country studied. On the
other hand, the adult literacy rate was only 83 per cent, below the levels recorded in the
Philippines, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Indonesia. While this may partly reflect measurement
factors, it would appear to be a cause for some concern. Malaysia was classified as a high
human development country under the UNDP human development index for 1994, scoring
fractionally lower than Thailand because of the lower literacy rate but well above any
other country included in the study.
1.2 Poverty
Estimates of poverty
The official poverty
line in Malaysia has been calculated since 1976. The original poverty line was based on
three components. First, household food requirements were derived by the Institute of
Medical Research by estimating the daily minimum calorie requirement (set at 9,910
calories per household), and establishing a basket of food items based on the usual
consumption patterns that just met this daily minimum. This basket was then costed by the
Department of Statistics. Second, household clothing requirements were derived in a
similar manner by the Ministry of Welfare. And third, requirements for items other than
food and clothing were estimated using the household expenditure survey conducted by the
Department of Statistics in 1973. The poverty line level of expenditure on these items was
set equal to the average actual household expenditure on items other than food and
clothing by those households who just met the poverty line levels of expenditure on food
and clothing. Since the initial poverty line was established in 1976, each of these three
components has been indexed by movements in the relevant groups of the consumer price
index. One poverty line has been established for the whole of peninsular Malaysia, with
separate poverty lines for Sabah and Sarawak.
The most recent
estimates for 1995 put the poverty line at RM425 ($170) per month per household for
peninsular Malaysia, with higher poverty lines of RM601 ($240) for Sabah and RM582 ($233)
for Sarawak. Based on these poverty lines, the incidence of poverty has fallen
significantly in Malaysia over the last two decades. In 1976, an estimated 42.4 per cent
of households were below the poverty line. This percentage has fallen consistently to 20.7
per cent in 1984, 17.1 per cent in 1990, and 9.6 per cent or 417,200 households in 1995.
The incidence of
poverty in 1995 was much higher in rural areas (16.1 per cent) than in urban areas (4.1
per cent). However, it should be noted that the poverty line is the same in both urban and
rural areas. Some commentators noted that this is unrealistic. Given the much higher
living costs in the Kuala Lumpur region, for instance, it was argued that a higher poverty
line is necessary for urban areas. One commentator suggested that an appropriate poverty
line for Kuala Lumpur would be monthly household income of RM1,000 ($400) or even higher.
This suggests that the official statistics understate poverty in the urban areas.
Recently, the Department of Statistics has started collecting separate price data for
urban and rural areas, and the Economic Planning Unit is considering establishing separate
poverty lines for urban and rural areas.
The government has not
published estimates of the incidence of poverty by ethnic group or state. It is understood
that the great majority of poor households are Bumiputera, although there are also
pockets of poverty among the Indian community. It is also understood that the incidence of
poverty is higher than the national average in the East Malaysian states of Sabah and
Sarawak, the northern states of Perlis and Kedah, and the east coast states of Kelantan
and Terengganu.
The government also
publishes estimates of hard-core poverty, defined as those households with incomes of less
than half the poverty line. In 1995, 2.2 per cent of households, or 93,500 households,
were in hard-core poverty. Hard-core poverty has fallen even more sharply than overall
poverty, falling from 17.0 per cent of households in 1976 to 6.9 per cent in 1984, 4.0 per
cent in 1990 and 2.2 per cent in 1995.
The Seventh Malaysia
Plan projects that the incidence of poverty will fall to 6.0 per cent of households by the
year 2000. However, this projection is likely to prove optimistic in light of the current
recession.
Policies for poverty
reduction
Poverty eradication has
been the major objective of government policy since the commencement of the New Economic
Policy in 1971. The main policy for reducing poverty has been rapid economic growth and
employment creation. Nevertheless, the government has also recognised the importance of
specific policies directed to the poor. This has enabled rapid economic growth to be
combined with an improving distribution of income and sharper reductions in the incidence
of poverty than would otherwise have been possible.
During the period of
the New Economic Policy from 1971 to 1990, there was a major focus on reducing poverty and
income disparities between ethnic groups, particularly by elevating the position of Bumiputera.
This included a range of programs to increase the incomes and productivity of agricultural
producers, and to improve access to basic amenities and the quality of life of low-income
households. Both of these groups consist predominantly of Bumiputera. Since the
Third Malaysia Plan covering the period 1976 to 1980, plans have had explicit targets for
poverty reduction. They have also identified specific programs for poverty reduction,
directed to specific target groups such as padi farmers, rubber smallholders,
coconut smallholders, fishermen, estate workers, agricultural labourers and indigenous
groups.
As incomes have
increased and absolute poverty has declined, the focus of government policy has shifted
somewhat from broad-based policies to reduce poverty in general to a greater focus on
eradicating poverty among the hard-core poor. Under the National Development Policy which
commenced in 1991, the government has established a special development program which
incorporates economic and social programs to assist the hard-core poor. This package
includes a number of elements:
(1) Income-generating
projects, primarily for cash crop cultivation, livestock rearing, aquaculture, petty
trading and cottage industries. During the Sixth Malaysia Plan covering the period 1991 to
1995, 16,740 hard-core poor households benefited from such projects.
(2) Programs to provide
and upgrade low-cost housing, and to provide basic amenities and facilities such as
electricity, safe drinking water and health facilities.
(3) Direct welfare
assistance and attitudinal change programmes. During the Sixth Malaysia Plan, 37,200
hard-core poor households received welfare assistance, while 39,060 participated in
attitudinal change programs.
(4) Programs to meet
the food and nutritional requirements of undernourished children, and to assist school
children from hard-core poor families.
(5) The Amanah Saham
Bumiputera scheme, a special investment scheme which enables hard-core poor Bumiputera
households to obtain an interest-free loan of RM5,000 ($2,000) to invest in a unit trust
program.
The government has also
recognised the importance of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the overall policy
framework to eradicate poverty. In particular, it has supported the microfinance
activities of Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (AIM) as an integral part of its poverty programs.
1.3 Overview of the
financial system
The financial system in
Malaysia includes 37 commercial banks, of which 23 are domestic and 14 are foreign. While
most of these commercial banks are owned by private interests, the two largest, Maybank
and Bank Bumiputra, have majority shareholding by the government. The commercial banks
have a combined total of 1,569 branches, disbursed widely throughout the country. In
addition, Bank Islam Malaysia provides Islamic banking services throughout the country.
There are also 40 finance companies, 12 merchant banks and seven discount houses. All of
these institutions are supervised by the central bank, Bank Negara Malaysia.
In addition, there are
seven development finance institutions owned by the government which are registered with,
but not supervised by, Bank Negara. These include the Development Bank of Malaysia, the
Industrial Bank of Malaysia and the Agriculture Bank of Malaysia (Bank Pertanian). There
are also a number of savings institutions, including the National Savings Bank, as well as
the credit cooperatives and various other non-bank financial intermediaries, all of which
are outside the scope of Bank Negara supervision.
The financial system
has been subject to a process of gradual liberalisation since around 1987, when interest
rates on deposits were deregulated. Interest rates on loans were partially deregulated in
1991, when each commercial bank was permitted to establish its own base lending rate
according to its cost of funds. In 1995 the average bank lending rate was substantially
positive in real terms at 7.6 per cent, well above the inflation rate of 3.4 per cent.
Exchange controls have also been liberalised since 1987. In 1994 a two-tier regulatory
system was introduced for commercial banks, allowing greater freedom to well-managed banks
with strong financial standing. This system has now been extended to finance companies and
merchant banks, which have also been given greater freedom to accept deposits. Malaysia
has the greatest financial depth of any country in this study with a ratio of money and
quasi-money to GDP of 85.0 per cent in 1995, no doubt reflecting its greater economic
development.
Nevertheless, a number
of regulatory requirements remain. Bank Negara has three lending guidelines requiring
banks to lend to particular priority sectors of the economy. None of these directly
targets poor borrowers. Interest rates also remain regulated by Bank Negara. Each bank
must establish a base lending rate, based on the Kuala Lumpur inter-bank offer rate
(KLIBOR), its cost of funds and its cost structure. The base lending rate for each bank
must be approved by Bank Negara, and the maximum lending rate for any loan is set at the
base lending rate plus 4 per cent. Some specific categories of loans face lower ceilings.
1.4 Overview of
microfinance
The only institutions
that engage in microfinance to a significant degree are a handful of NGOs. Of these, by
far the largest is Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (AIM). AIM was established in 1987 and is
modelled on the Grameen Bank. Loans are provided for any type of legal income-generating
activity. As in the Grameen Bank, poor borrowers form themselves into groups of five who
guarantee each others loans. There is also compulsory group training, and a
compulsory savings component. In the past loans were provided interest free with a small
administrative charge, but from 1997 new loans are subject to an interest rate of 19 per
cent. AIM offers a number of loan products.
(1) Ikhtiar Loan Scheme
1 provides loans to poor households with average monthly incomes of not more than RM270
($108). Initial loans are for a maximum of RM500 ($200), increasing to RM2,000 ($800) for
the fourth and subsequent loans. Loans are provided for a period of 50 weeks, with weekly
repayments.
(2) Ikhtiar Loan Scheme
2 provides loans of between RM1,500 ($600) and RM5,000 ($2,000) to borrowers who have
graduated from scheme 1 and have increased their monthly household incomes to at least
RM405 ($162). The repayment period is between 50 and 100 weeks.
(3) Ikhtiar Loan Scheme
3 provides loans of between RM5,000 ($2,000) and RM10,000 ($4,000) to borrowers with a
good track record under the other schemes and monthly household incomes of at least RM600
($240). These loans have a longer repayment period, up to five years.
(4) In addition,
special education loans up to RM500 ($200) and special housing loans up to RM2,000 ($800)
are available to borrowers who have completed some loans under scheme 1.
As at 30 April 1997,
AIM had 30,029 current borrowers under schemes 1, 2 and 3, including 18,613 under scheme
1. In addition, there were 9,312 education loans and 3,900 housing loans with outstanding
balances. AIM is currently operating in nine states of Malaysia, and it is understood that
the vast majority of borrowers are ethnic Malays. Repayment rates were reported to be 99.9
per cent.
There are several other
NGOs involved in microfinance, but they operate on a much smaller scale than AIM. Yayasan
Usahamaju is a Grameen Bank replicator operating in Sabah, with around 5,000 borrowers.
Another NGO using the Grameen Bank approach is Partners in Enterprise, which has recently
started lending in the Batu Caves area near Kuala Lumpur. Another program which provides
individual loans to poor borrowers is the Projek Tekun pilot project of the Centre for
Policy Research at the Malaysian University of Science (Universiti Sains Malaysia), which
operates in the states of Penang, Kelantan and Terengganu. It is also understood that a
number of the state governments operate foundations to alleviate poverty and that some of
these incorporate microfinance components, although in most cases these are grants rather
than loans.
Other institutions do
not appear to be actively involved in microfinance. Commercial banks are involved in
microfinance through extending lines of credit to AIM, and as a conduit for schemes such
as the loan fund for hawkers and petty traders operated by the Credit Guarantee
Corporation (CGC), although the schemes do not generally reach poor borrowers. Some
commercial banks have very small programs for individual lending to poor borrowers. The
financial system also includes a number of urban and rural credit cooperatives which
provide savings and credit facilities for their members. The urban credit cooperatives
have a combined membership of around 40,000, but these are predominantly relatively
well-off wage and salary earners. The rural credit cooperatives have much lower outreach
of around 2,000. While they are not targeted at the poor, it is understood that some of
their members are low-paid workers in the estate sector.
AIM has received large
volumes of grants and soft loans from government and from government-related agencies.
This relatively easy access to funds has enabled it to expand outreach much more rapidly
than would otherwise have been possible, with AIM now the largest Grameen Bank replication
outside of Bangladesh. Given the relatively small number of poor households in Malaysia
and the widespread opportunities for wage employment which reduce the need for poor
households to rely on self-employment, the outreach of AIM and the other small programs is
reasonably high in relation to demand. Nevertheless, there is some scope for expansion,
and AIM is currently seeking to move into new areas. For instance, it has recently
expanded its operations to Sarawak in East Malaysia. AIM and Yayasan Usahamaju could also
increase their numbers of clients by relaxing their means tests. For instance, AIM
currently uses a means test for monthly household income of only RM270 ($108) per month,
above the hard-core poverty line of RM212 per month but well below the overall poverty
line of RM425 ($170) per month.
Ready access to cheap
funds has reduced the pressure on AIM to operate on a self-sufficient basis. In the past,
it charged borrowers a modest administrative charge, equivalent to an effective interest
rate of around 5 per cent. However, grants for operational expenses have been reduced
considerably, and AIM is now focusing much more strongly on sustainability. It has
recently increased its interest rates to 19 per cent, and hopes to be able to cover all of
its operational expenses from interest earnings by the end of 1997. The other NGOs are
still relatively new and are operating on a small scale, and are not able to cover their
operational expenses from interest earnings at this stage. Yayasan Usahamaju has received
grants from the Sabah state government, while Partners in Enterprise has received
donations from the private sector and from foreign donors.
2 Arrangements for
direct support
2.1 Support for
specialised microfinance institutions
Both the government of
Malaysia and the state governments have provided considerable support for AIM, while the
smaller microfinance institutions (MFIs) have also received funding from government and/or
donor agencies. Between 1989 and 1995, the government of Malaysia gave AIM an annual grant
from the budget, equivalent to around 60 per cent of its operational costs. These grants
have now been terminated. AIM has also received grants from state governments, ranging
from around 10 to 40 per cent of operational costs in those states in which it operates,
with the amount depending on the particular state government. These grants are continuing.
AIM has also received
grants and soft loans from the government for loan capital. These funds have been
channelled through the Foundation for Islamic Economic Development (YPEIM). The Sixth
Malaysia Plan covering the period 1991 to 1995 allocated RM18.2 million ($7.3 million) as
a grant to AIM for its revolving fund. YPEIM is providing this amount to AIM over a
30-year period from 1991 to 2020. The Seventh Malaysia Plan covering the period 1996 to
2000 provides for an interest-free loan to AIM of RM200 million ($80 million). The loan
will be disbursed over the period 1996 to 2000, and AIM will not have to start repaying it
until 2006.
AIM has also received
soft loans from the Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC) and from some of the commercial
banks. In 1992 CGC allocated an initial sum of RM2 million ($800,000) from its own
resources as a revolving fund for on-lending by AIM. In 1995 the revolving fund was
increased to RM5 million ($2 million). In 1996 CGC organised another revolving fund for
AIM, with 15 financial institutions contributing a total of RM13 million ($5.2 million).
Both of these revolving funds are provided to AIM at a highly concessional interest rate
of 1 per cent. AIM has received further soft loans at 1 per cent interest from the two
commercial banks with majority government shareholding, namely Bank Bumiputra (RM4 million
or $1.6 million) and Maybank (RM5 million or $2 million), as well as a grant of RM750,000
($300,000) and soft loan of RM300,000 ($120,000) from Bank Islam Malaysia.
Hence, AIM has received
large volumes of grants and soft loans from government and from government-related
agencies. These funds have reduced the pressure on AIM to operate on a self-sufficient
basis, and have clearly enabled it to expand its outreach much more rapidly than would
otherwise have been possible. In this respect Malaysia is very different to any other
country included in the study. The incidence of poverty is much lower, while per capita
incomes are much higher. It is therefore possible to access far more public resources,
relative to the number of poor households, for programs to reduce poverty. The experience
of AIM has shown that in Malaysia there are sufficient public resources for an institution
like AIM, with relatively low levels of self-sufficiency, to reach a significant
proportion of poor households by relying heavily on government funding.
Reflecting this
relative abundance of public resources and to the extent that microfinance is an effective
strategy for reducing poverty, there is a strong case for the government of Malaysia to
subsidise it as part of its overall policy strategy for poverty reduction. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that AIM has indeed contributed to significant improvements in the lives
of many borrowers, although it would be appropriate to conduct a more rigorous study of
the impact of the program. In the meantime, it would appear appropriate for governments to
continue to subsidise AIM as an effective strategy for poverty reduction.
Given the concessional
loans currently being disbursed, it is not necessary for AIM to achieve full financial
self-sufficiency, at least in the short term. This enables it to continue to concentrate
primarily on increasing outreach. While AIM already has significant outreach, there is
still considerable scope for it to expand by widening its geographic base and relaxing its
means test to cover slightly less poor households. It may also be appropriate for it to
consider deepening its activities by offering its clients a wider range of services, such
as more flexible savings products.
At the same time, the
recent increase in the interest rate charged by AIM is to be welcomed. As noted above, the
increase is expected to enable AIM to attain operational self-sufficiency. Access to
public resources is not unlimited, as demonstrated by the fact that the government of
Malaysia has recently replaced grant assistance with soft loans. The current financial
crisis is also giving rise to cuts in government spending in a number of areas. Increasing
self-sufficiency will ensure that the program can be sustained over the medium term, and
will also enable greater AIM to achieve greater outreach for a given call on public
resources.
2.2 Support through
the banking system
Directed credit schemes
Bank Negara has three
lending guidelines requiring banks to lend to particular priority sectors of the economy.
First, commercial banks and finance companies are required to maintain loans to Bumiputera
at 30 per cent of total loans outstanding. Base figures for loans outstanding are revised
periodically, and the current requirement is for loans to Bumiputera to be at least
30 per cent of loans outstanding as at 31 December 1995.
Second, banks and
finance companies are required to set aside a certain amount for financing low- and
medium-cost housing (that is, housing units costing less than RM100,000 or $40,000).
Targets for low- and medium-cost housing are determined in the Malaysia national plans,
and quotas are then allocated to individual commercial banks and finance companies based
on their assets, capital base and other criteria. The global allocation for all banks is
currently around RM10 billion ($4 billion), equivalent to around 4 to 5 per cent of total
loans outstanding.
Third, banks and
finance companies are required to provide loans to small business without good security or
established track record under the New Principal Guarantee Scheme of the CGC. At present,
commercial banks are required to provide a total of RM1 billion ($400 million) under this
scheme, around 0.5 per cent of their loans outstanding. Again, the allocation is divided
between banks based on their assets, capital base and other criteria. Individual loans
under the scheme must be RM500,000 ($200,000) or less, and are partially guaranteed by
CGC. Of the total allocation for each bank, at least 50 per cent must be provided to Bumiputera.
None of these
guidelines directly targets poor borrowers. Given the relatively large loan sizes and the
fact that the banks will tend to lend to households within the target groups which are
better off, it is unlikely that these requirements benefit the poor to any significant
extent.
Microfinance
activities of the Credit Guarantee Corporation
CGC was established in
1972 with Bank Negara and the commercial banks as its shareholders. It is currently owned
as to 20 per cent by Bank Negara, 50 per cent by the 37 commercial banks, and 30 per cent
by the 40 finance companies operating in Malaysia. Its main function is to guarantee loans
by banks to small and medium enterprises, especially those with inadequate collateral or
without collateral or track record, who would otherwise not have access to credit. While
most of its activities are beyond the scope of microfinance, it also provides some support
to microfinance loans.
One scheme is the loan
fund for hawkers and petty traders, which provides loan funds and 100 per cent guarantee
for loans up to RM10,000 ($4,000) to eligible businesses by commercial banks and finance
companies. Eligible businesses are: permanent and market stalls selling groceries, food,
handicrafts, etc; mobile stalls with a specific place of business; and stalls and shops
providing services such as tailoring, barber, welding, motor repairs, etc. To participate
in the scheme, borrowers must be Malaysian, above 18 years of age, have a valid licence to
trade, be directly involved in the business, and have a specific place of business.
Borrowers with existing business loans in excess of RM10,000 ($4,000) or with an adverse
borrowing record are ineligible. Loans must have terms ranging from 42 weeks to 138 weeks,
with weekly repayments.
A closely related
scheme is the Association Special Loan Scheme. Conditions under this scheme are
essentially the same as under the loan fund for hawkers and petty traders, except that
borrowers apply for a loan through their trade association. The trade association then
processes, evaluates and approves the application and applies to CGC for guarantee cover.
CGC then issues a letter of agreement to the participating bank or finance company, which
releases the loan.
These schemes are
funded through a one-off soft loan from the government to CGC of RM120 million ($48
million). This money is on-lent to commercial banks and finance companies free of
interest, and banks lend to final borrowers at an interest rate of 4 per cent to cover
administrative costs. Repayment rates under the scheme are reported to be high, with only
around 6 per cent of loans classified as non-performing (in the early 1990s, however,
non-performing loans were up to 40 per cent of loans granted under the schemes). In 1996,
6,079 loans were granted under the loan fund for hawkers and petty traders, and a further
291 under the association special loan scheme. Nevertheless, CGC reported that banks
generally follow their usual credit practices in approving loans under the schemes. While
this no doubt accounts for the high repayment rates, it also means that the schemes do not
generally reach poor borrowers.
As noted above, CGC has
also provided support for AIM in its microfinance activities, through a revolving fund
from its own resources of RM5 million ($2 million) and by organising an additional
revolving fund of RM13 million ($5.2 million) with contributions from 15 financial
institutions. In 1996, 8,407 loans were approved under these revolving funds. In addition,
CGC has allocated RM6 million ($2.4 million) to support the Projek Tekun scheme operated
by the Centre for Policy Research at the Malaysian University of Science, with 449 loans
supported in 1996.
3 Regulation of
non-bank microfinance institutions
3.1 The broad
regulatory framework
Registration
There are number of
options for registration for NGOs. AIM and Yayasan Usahamaju are registered as trusts,
pursuant to the Trustee Act 1949 and Trustees (Incorporation) Act 1952. As trusts, they
are required to file an instrument of trust with the Attorney-Generals Office,
covering matters such as the objectives of the trust, appointment of trustees, rules and
functions of the board of trustees, arrangements for meetings, maintenance of annual
accounts, responsibilities of the management committee, and detailed rules and
regulations. They are required to submit their annual report, audited financial statements
and any amendments to the instrument of trust to the Attorney-Generals Office.
Partners in Enterprise,
by contrast, is registered under the Companies Act 1965 as a non-profit company limited by
guarantee. To be registered as a company, two or more persons must lodge a memorandum and
articles of association, outlining the name and objectives of the company, with the
Registrar of Companies. Companies are required to maintain regular accounts, and to
provide their audited annual financial statements to the registrar. The Act also sets out
various requirements concerning the office and name, directors and officers, and meetings
and proceedings. It is understood that these requirements are generally quite
straightforward.
Many NGOs are
registered as societies with the Registrar of Societies, pursuant to the Societies Act
1966, although it is not known if any MFIs have registered under these provisions. To
apply for registration as a society, it is necessary to complete an application providing
details of the name, address, purpose and office-bearers of the society, as well as the
rules. It is also necessary to have an annual general meeting, and to provide details of
the office-bearers and the financial statements to the registrar on an annual basis.
All of these provisions
are designed for NGOs in general, rather than for MFIs. Indeed, registration under one of
these Acts does not permit an NGO to engage in microfinance. Under Malaysian law, only
specified institutions such as banks, cooperative societies and licensed moneylenders are
permitted to lend money in consideration of a larger sum being repaid. Trusts, non-profit
companies and societies are generally not permitted to make loans. If such bodies are to
operate as MFIs and make loans, they need to obtain a specific exemption from the
provisions of the Moneylenders Act 1951.
Such exemption must be
obtained on a one-off basis from the Minister of Housing and Local Government, and is
generally granted for a period of three to four years. AIM, Yayasan Usahamaju and Partners
in Enterprise have all obtained exemptions under this provision. The ministry requires
NGOs who have received this exemption to provide their annual report and audited financial
statements on an annual basis, and portfolio data once every six months. However, there
are no clear criteria for obtaining an exemption, and some commentators stated that it may
be difficult for smaller NGOs without connections to obtain an exemption. It would be
appropriate for the government to establish a transparent framework for the registration
of MFIs based on a clearly established set of guidelines, rather than requiring them to
seek exemption from the Moneylenders Act.
There are no
requirements on NGOs which receive foreign donations to seek prior approval from any
government agency, or even to report that they have received such donations. Any profits
from interest or other income earned by MFIs are subject to income tax, but to date no
MFIs have made a profit. At present, donations to MFIs are not eligible for income tax
deduction. It is understood that it would be difficult to obtain exempt status for such
donations, on the grounds that MFIs are engaged in lending money for interest. Given the
focus of MFIs on poverty reduction, it would be appropriate to allow donations to them to
be income tax deductible.
Savings mobilisation
The Backing and
Financial Institutions Act 1989 provides that no person shall carry on banking business,
including receiving deposits on current account, deposit account, savings account or other
similar account, without a licence as a bank or financial institution. Hence, it is clear
that NGOs are not permitted to accept deposits from the general public. While it is not
clear if this provision also covers compulsory and/or other savings by members of MFIs, it
is understood that Bank Negara has determined that NGOs can accept compulsory savings at
least, so long as these compulsory savings are put into a trust account and not used as
loanable funds. AIM and Yayasan Usahamaju keep their borrowers savings in separate
bank accounts in the names of the borrowers.
This would appear to be
unnecessarily restrictive. Under the Grameen Bank model used by AIM and Yayasan Usahamaju,
almost all members are net borrowers, with the outstanding balance on their loans greater
than the balance of compulsory savings. Clearly, such members are not at risk of losing
their savings if the institution fails. For these reasons, the Consultative Group to
Assist the Poorest (CGAP) has argued that compulsory savings should probably be thought of
as part of the cost of the loan, rather than as true financial intermediation requiring
public intervention to protect depositors. Most countries in this study allow MFIs to use
the compulsory savings of members as loanable funds. It would be appropriate for the
government to permit MFIs to use the compulsory savings of their members in their lending
programs. This would increase their access to loanable funds and reduce administrative
costs.
3.2 Interest rates
There are no
regulations on MFIs concerning the interest rates that they can charge borrowers. In
practice, MFIs have tended to maintain interest rates and charges at low levels,
reflecting community expectations and relatively easy access to funds from government and
donor agencies. As noted above, AIM in 1997 moved from a flat administrative charge to an
interest rate of 19 per cent. While this is below the level charged by successful MFIs in
most other countries and below the level necessary for full financial self-sufficiency, it
is estimated that it will be sufficient for AIM to cover all of its operational expenses.
3.3 Prudential
regulation and supervision
There is no prudential
regulation and supervision of MFIs, in terms of matters such as minimum capital
requirements, capital adequacy ratios, reserve or liquidity requirements, or loan loss
provisioning requirements. Reporting requirements are also limited to the provision of
annual accounts to the various bodies that regulate NGOs, and do not relate to the
specific needs of MFIs. However, AIM provides its annual report, audited annual financial
statements and annual portfolio data to Bank Negara on the basis that the banks from which
it obtains funds are required to report to Bank Negara. When requested, AIM provides more
frequent data to Bank Negara.
It is generally
considered that it is not appropriate to subject MFIs which do not accept deposits from
the public to prudential regulation and supervision. Systems used by regulatory agencies
to supervise financial institutions are generally not appropriate to the needs of MFIs. In
most countries there is a large number of small MFIs, and it would not be feasible for
regulators to monitor their activities properly. And in most cases there is scope for
other, more cost-effective approaches to ensuring that MFIs operate at a high standard,
such as through the policies of second tier microfinance institutions or through
self-regulation.
However, it is not
clear if these considerations apply in the case of Malaysia. Given the very small number
of MFIs, it would not be onerous for Bank Negara or some other regulatory agency to
establish some system for monitoring them. Moreover, as discussed below, there would not
appear to be much scope for monitoring through a second tier microfinance institution or
through a system of self-regulation.
It would therefore be
appropriate for the government to establish a small cell of one or two people within Bank
Negara or some other regulatory agency to monitor and supervise MFIs. The same body could
also be responsible for registering MFIs, as discussed above (it should be noted that if
Bank Negara were to undertake this role some change in focus would be required, as it has
had little involvement with microfinance to date). It would be necessary to develop
performance and reporting standards that are appropriate to the needs of MFIs, covering
matters such as loan classification and provisioning, savings facilities, accounting and
audit standards, progress towards self-sufficiency, etc. Such standards should be
developed in consultation with the MFIs themselves. Experience in developing performance
and reporting standards for MFIs in other countries, such as through the Palli Karma
Sahayak Foundation in Bangladesh and the Coalition to Develop Standards for Microfinance
in the Philippines may also be useful (see the Bangladesh and Philippines country
studies).
3.4 Performance and
reporting standards of second tier institutions
In many countries,
second tier microfinance institutions have been established to channel funds to
specialised MFIs. Often, performance and reporting standards established by such
institutions become norms for the microfinance sector. There is no such second tier
institution in Malaysia (although to a limited extent the Credit Guarantee Corporation
(CGC) has channelled funds to MFIs as an adjunct to its primary responsibilities). Given
the very small number of NGOs and the relatively small size of the potential market for
microfinance, there is little reason to establish a specialist second tier institution.
Hence, this approach to establishing standards for microfinance does not appear to be an
option in the case of Malaysia.
3.5 Self-regulation
There are no formal
arrangements for self-regulation or coordination among the MFIs operating in Malaysia.
Given the small number of MFIs and the dominant position of AIM, this is perhaps not
surprising. It is understood that one of the smaller NGOs has expressed interest in
establishing a national network of microfinance NGOs, but there has been no further
progress to date. Nevertheless, both AIM and Yayasan Usahamaju are members of the
international Credit and Savings for the Hardcore Poor (CASHPOR) network of Grameen Bank
replicators, and there have been some informal contacts between these organisations and
Partners in Enterprise. In terms of policy dialogue, AIM commented that it has a very good
relationship with government, and is able to engage in constructive policy dialogue on
issues relating to microfinance. It would nevertheless be appropriate at least to
establish an informal network of MFIs to exchange information and to ensure that the views
of all MFIs are taken into account in discussions with government.
4 Regulation of
banks
4.1 Licensing and
minimum capital requirements
As noted above, the
Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 provides that no person shall accept deposits
without a licence as a bank or financial institution. Unlike many other countries included
in this study, there is no network of small banks in Malaysia. The minimum capital
requirement to establish a commercial bank is RM20 million ($8 million). This is likely to
be too high for an MFI wishing to establish a bank, or a body wishing to establish a small
bank at the local level. While the minimum capital needed to establish a finance company
is less at RM5 million ($2 million), finance companies are not allowed to accept deposits
on current account. Moreover, Bank Negara considers that there are already too many
financial institutions in Malaysia, and is currently not issuing any new licences for the
establishment of either banks or finance companies. In fact, it is seeking to encourage
existing banks and finance companies to amalgamate.
Experience in other
countries suggests that small banks are much more likely to become involved in
microfinance than large banks. Hence, if banks are to play an active role in microfinance,
it is important that there be some mechanism to enable small banks to be licensed. Such
banks would also tend to serve small entrepreneurs who in many cases have only limited
access to financial services at present. It would therefore be appropriate for the
government to establish a framework for licensing small banks, by setting a realistic
minimum capital requirement and removing any other restrictions which prevent the
establishment of small banks. In this regard, it may be useful to examine the experiences
of countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines (see the Indonesia and Philippines
country studies).
4.2 Interest rates
As noted above, the
maximum lending rate for any bank loan is set at the base lending rate for the particular
bank plus 4 per cent. In addition, some specific loans face lower ceilings. For instance,
loans for low- and medium-cost housing are subject to a ceiling of the base lending rate
plus 1.75 per cent or 9 per cent, whichever is lower. Loans of less than RM500,000
($200,000) guaranteed by the Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC) under the new principal
guarantee scheme face an interest rate ceiling of base lending rate plus 2 per cent. Banks
are also required to lend at below market interest rates under various other schemes where
they are able to obtain refinancing or soft loans from Bank Negara.
Small loans to poor
borrowers inevitably incur high administrative costs. The interest rate ceiling of base
lending rate plus 4 per cent would make it very difficult if not impossible for any bank
to cover the costs of small loans to poor borrowers. In addition to the minimum capital
requirements and other restrictions discussed above, this ceiling further discourages
regulated banks from becoming involved in microfinance. It is also perhaps surprising that
Malaysia retains interest rate controls when a number of other countries included in this
study with less developed financial systems namely Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri
Lanka and Thailand have removed them. It would be appropriate for the government to
remove interest rate ceilings applying to loans by regulated banks, or at least review the
spreads applicable to small and very small loans.
4.3 Prudential
regulation and supervision
Commercial banks are
subject to a capital adequacy ratio of 8 per cent of risk-weighted assets in line with the
Basle Accord. There is a statutory reserve requirement of 13.5 per cent of net eligible
liabilities, to be held as an interest-free deposit with Bank Negara. In addition,
commercial banks are required to maintain liquid assets equal to 17 per cent of
liabilities. In terms of loan loss provisioning, commercial banks are required to maintain
a general provision of 1.5 per cent of loans outstanding, plus specific provisions of 100
per cent for bad debts and 50 per cent for doubtful debts. Banks are also required to
provide a series of reports to Bank Negara on a weekly, fortnightly, monthly, quarterly
and annual basis. These requirements would not appear to impose any undue restrictions on
small banks or banks involved in microfinance. This is largely academic at this stage, as
there is no scope for the establishment of small banks in any case.
There are no
restrictions preventing commercial banks from establishing linkages with MFIs by extending
loans for on-lending to poor borrowers. As noted above, a number of commercial banks have
provided loans to AIM, albeit not on a commercial basis.
5 Summary and
recommendations
With GNP per capita of
$3,890 in 1995, Malaysia is by far the wealthiest country included in the study and is
classified as an upper middle income country by the World Bank. Performance in terms of
human development is also generally good. The incidence of poverty was estimated at 9.6
per cent of households in 1995, the lowest for any country in the study.
The only institutions
in Malaysia that engage in microfinance to a significant degree are a handful of
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Of these, by far the largest is Amanah Ikhtiar
Malaysia (AIM), the largest Grameen Bank replicator outside of Bangladesh with around
30,000 borrowers. There are several other much smaller NGOs involved in microfinance.
While total outreach is small it is reasonably high in relation to demand, given the
relatively small number of poor households in Malaysia and the widespread opportunities
for wage employment which reduce the need for poor households to rely on self-employment.
Arrangements for
direct support
Both the government of
Malaysia and the state governments have provided considerable support to AIM, for both
operational expenses and loanable funds. The smaller microfinance institutions (MFIs) have
also received funding from government and/or donor agencies.
Continue to
subsidise AIM
These funds have
reduced the pressure to operate on a self-sufficient basis, and have enabled AIM in
particular to expand its outreach much more rapidly than would otherwise have been
possible. Malaysia is very different to any other country included in the study, in that
it is possible to obtain quite large amounts of public resources, relative to the number
of poor households, for programs to reduce poverty. Governments should continue to
subsidise AIM as an effective strategy for poverty reduction. This will enable AIM to
concentrate primarily at increasing its outreach, and possibly offering a wider range of
services to its clients. Nevertheless, access to public resources is not unlimited, and
AIMs recent decision to increase interest rates and strive for operational
self-sufficiency is to be welcomed.
While some support to
small borrowers is provided through the banking system, it is unlikely that much of this
reaches the poor. None of Bank Negaras lending guidelines for banks targets poor
borrowers. The various schemes of the Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC) also do not reach
poor borrowers.
Regulation of
non-bank microfinance institutions
Establish transparent
framework for registering NGOs
The registration
procedures for NGOs are not designed with microfinance in mind, and NGOs wishing to engage
in microfinance must obtain a specific exemption from the provisions of the Moneylenders
Act 1951. While a number of institutions have obtained an exemption, there are no clear
criteria. The government should establish a transparent framework for the registration of
MFIs, based on a clearly established set of guidelines and outside the ambit of the
Moneylenders Act. The government should also allow donations to MFIs to be tax deductible.
Permit MFIs to use
members savings in lending programs
At present, Bank Negara
only permits MFIs to accept compulsory savings if they are put into a trust account and
not used as loanable funds. This is unnecessarily restrictive. The government should
permit MFIs to use at least the compulsory savings of their members in their lending
programs.
There are no
regulations on MFIs concerning the interest rates that they can charge borrowers. There is
also no prudential regulation and supervision of MFIs, in terms of matters such as minimum
capital requirements, capital adequacy ratios, reserve or liquidity requirements, or loan
loss provisioning requirements.
Develop performance
and reporting standards
While it is generally
considered that it is not appropriate to subject non-depository MFIs to prudential
regulation and supervision, it is not clear if the usual considerations apply in the case
of Malaysia. Given the very small number of MFIs, it would not be onerous to establish
some system for monitoring them. And while in some countries second tier microfinance
institutions have developed performance and reporting standards for MFIs, there is no such
institution in Malaysia. The government should consider establishing a small cell within
Bank Negara or some other regulatory agency to monitor and supervise MFIs. This body could
develop performance and reporting standards that are appropriate to the needs of MFIs, in
consultation with the MFIs themselves and drawing on experience from countries such as
Bangladesh and the Philippines.
Establish informal
MFI network
There are no clear
arrangements for self-regulation or coordination among the MFIs operating in Malaysia. The
major MFIs should establish an informal network to exchange information and for policy
dialogue with government.
Regulation of banks
Establish framework to
license small banks
The minimum capital
requirement to establish a commercial bank is too high for an MFI wishing to establish a
bank, or for a body wishing to establish a small bank at the local level. Moreover, Bank
Negara is currently not issuing any licences for the establishment of new banks.
Experience in other countries suggests that if banks are to play an active role in
microfinance, it is important that there be some mechanism for the establishment of small
banks. Such banks also tend to serve small entrepreneurs who do not have access to
financial services. The government should establish a framework for licensing small banks,
by setting a realistic minimum capital requirement and removing any other restrictions
which prevent the establishment of such banks.
Remove interest rate
ceilings
The maximum lending
rate for any bank loan is set at the base lending rate for the particular bank plus 4 per
cent. This ceiling makes it very difficult if not impossible for any bank to cover the
costs of small loans to poor borrowers, and further discourages banks from becoming
involved in microfinance. It is also perhaps surprising that Malaysia retains interest
rate controls when other countries with less developed financial systems have removed
them. The government should remove the interest rate ceilings applying to loans by
regulated banks, or at least review the spreads applicable to small and very small loans.
There are no
restrictions preventing commercial banks from establishing linkages with MFIs. A number of
commercial banks have provided loans to AIM, albeit not on a commercial basis.
References
Government of
Malaysia. 1996. Seventh Malaysia Plan 19962000. Economic Planning Unit, Kuala
Lumpur.
Singh, Avtar. 1995.
Poverty eradication: The role of government, NGOs and SHGs in Malaysia. In Papers
Presented at the International Seminar on Development of Rural Poor Through Self-Help
Groups, National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, Bangalore.
Siwar, Chamhuri.
1996. Microfinance Capacity Assessment Study: The Malaysian Case. Asia-Pacific
Development Centre, Kuala Lumpur.
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